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This study explores whether the attacker’s daily casualty rate (DCR) changes 
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Engagement Database from the Dupuy Institute. There are data on 253 battles, 96 of 
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the DCR is different in urban operations. A linear regression model is constructed to 
predict outcomes of similar engagements and to see the effect of each variable. It is 
concluded that the attacker’s daily casualty rate is, on average, lower in urban operations. 
Terrain and force ratio are the most effective drivers of the daily casualty rate. In 
addition, it is seen that allied forces (U.S., U.K. and Canada) had a different approach to 
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Urban warfare has always been a great concern for military planners. Although, 
Military Strategy books recommend avoiding urban operations, history records numerous 
occasions where important battles occurred in urban areas. Theses occasions include 
some unforgettable battles such as the battles for Troy, Istanbul, Berlin, Stalingrad, Suez 
City, Grozny and many others. 
As urbanization grows, it is unlikely to find a campaign that does not include 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). MOUT is becoming increasingly 
important. Rapid urbanization and the resources that urban areas have, such as 
communication and transportation nodes, make MOUT more likely. We are more likely 
to see defending forces operating in urban area when they are outnumbered, in order to 
because they will want to use the advantages of cover and concealment and man-made 
construction in urban areas.  
Until recently, the question regarding MOUT has been the outcome of battles. As 
the public concern over the number of casualties increased, the focus shifted to trying to 
predict the number of casualties. The days of “war of attrition” have gone for the modern 
militaries. In modern wars, a general is not considered successful unless he wins the 
battle with minimum casualties.  
This thesis analyzes the effects of urban terrain on the attacker’s daily casualty 
rates. The main focus is to distinguish differences between urban and non-urban 
operations in terms of attacker’s daily casualty rate (DCR). Also, analyses are conducted 
to find what causes the difference in DCR according to the terrain. 
The data set used in the thesis was compiled by the Dupuy Institute (TDI). It 
consists of 96 urban and 156 non-urban engagements. Each data point shows a division-
level engagement. All the observations are selected from the WW II era. The opposing  
 xvi
forces are Canada, U.K., U.S., the Soviet Union and Germany. Since there are limited 
number of observations for Canada and U.K., they are combined with U.S. engagements 
under the name of “Allied.”  
This data set is selected for a couple of different reasons. First of all, this data set 
includes a sufficient number of urban and non-urban engagements to conduct the 
analysis. Also each observation was verified by checking the reports of the both sides; 
thus it presumably is reliable. Furthermore, the battles occurred at about the same time, in 
similar locations and between similar forces.  
The “Capture Rate Study, Phase I and II” of TDI concluded that for casualty 
effectiveness, Allied and German forces were almost the same and German forces, more 
effective than Soviet forces. However, it is assumed that these differences remained 
constant throughout the period of the data set. Also, it is assumed that there is no 
technological difference between the forces. These assumptions enable the analysis to 
claim that any differences between the DCR’s in urban and non-urban operations are 
actually the result of the terrain. 
The model to predict the DCR is constructed by using linear regression. 
Attacker’s strength, front width, linear density, country as well as force ratio, terrain and 
defender’s strength are used to build the model.  It is concluded that power 
transformations and two-way interactions are necessary in the model to increase its 
ability to explain the variability of the data set and to comply with the assumptions of 
linear regression. 
The hypotheses tests revealed that DCR in urban operations is lower than in rural 
operations. This result seemed counterintuitive. However, the variable which is lower in 
urban operations is the daily casualty rate, not the total number of casualties. Since urban 
operations take more time, even thought the daily casualty rate is lower, the total number 




0 2 4 6 8










X C oun try: G er
X C oun try: A llied
X C oun try: S ov
 
 
The analyses resulted that terrain and the attacker’s strength are the most 
important factors for determining DCR. Defender’s strength does not significantly 
change the DCR. The German and Allied forces had almost the same daily casualty rates, 
somewhat lower than those of the Soviet forces. Although the analysis indicates that 
Allied forces had a different understanding of MOUT, their casualty rates were almost 
the same as those of the German forces. In addition, the effect of each variable is 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
The need for understanding the nature of war can be seen throughout history. 
Scholars and military planners alike have long looked for a way to understand the physics 
of war. Despite modern developments in warfare, Sun Tzu remains one of the best-
known warrior-philosophers, whose 25-century-old studies still affect every phase of war 
planning and execution.  
Most of the early studies gave priority to the outcome of the battle, because 
human casualties were not considered as important as they are today. Improvements in 
technology, communication and welfare make human loss in battle more sensational 
today than it has ever been. Nowadays losing even one soldier in combat seems to affect 
the prestige of a nation. Thus, determining a method to estimate the number of casualties 
is becoming more important every day. 
While early studies relied on pure observation and data analysis, contemporary 
studies also benefit from simulations that can be used to estimate the number of 
casualties. Once a simulation is set up, many replications and iterations can be made in a 
relatively short time. However, setting up a simulation can be costly in both money and 
time. Most simulations need results from data analysis to feed the model requiring 
reliable data, which may be as costly to produce as obtaining results from the simulations 
themselves.  
Consider the following key finding from a 2001 study on world urbanization 
conducted by the United Nations that points out the increasing rate of urbanization: 
Half the world population is expected to live in urban areas in 2007. The 
urban population reached 2.9 billion in 2000 and is expected to rise to 5 
billion by 2030, whereas 30 per cent of the world population lived in 
urban areas in 1950 and the proportion of urban dwellers rose to 47 per 
cent by 2000 and is projected to attain 60 per cent by 2030. [Ref. 1] 
Given the increasing ratio of urban population to rural population, it is nearly certain that 
future wars will involve urban combat. Almost every operation involving U.S. forces 
after WWII has required combat in urban terrain. The basic reason is the superiority of 
2 
U.S. forces in technology and training. This dominance has forced inferior forces to use 
populated areas as a shelter. To minimize civilian casualties, technologically advanced 
forces have had to change their rules of engagement (ROE), in a way that reduced their 
technological advantage. 
As a result of dense civilian populations and the complex structure of urban 
terrain, Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) have aspects different from non-
urban operations. For this reason, combat in cities has tended to be avoided by 
commanders unless absolutely necessary. Thus, in studying casualties one must also 
consider the effects of terrain. However, most of the studies concerned with predicting 
casualties either used data on non-urban operations or did not make any discrimination 
between urban and non-urban operations.  
This thesis will focus on finding the differences between casualties in urban and 
non-urban operations by means of data analysis tools. The Dupuy Institute constructed 
the data through recent research and by extracting related observations from the existing 
Division Level Engagement Database (DLEDB). Data are selected such that battles 
occurred close together in time and space. The reliance on the conclusions of “Capture 
Rate Study” renders spatial effects unimportant. [Ref. 2] 
Considering the aforementioned factors, the most reliable and available data 
comes from World War II (WWII). The data set includes 253 division-level engagements 
from early 1943 to the beginning of 1945 executed in the European Theater of Operations 
(ETO) between allied and axis forces. Of 253 engagements, 97 are urban engagements 
and 156 are non-urban engagements. 
B. BACKGROUND 
After the devastation of WWII, the international community, especially developed 
countries, became more sensitive about the loss of human life in wars. They started 
questioning whether material gains were worth losses of human lives. In addition, people 
started watching the destructive effects of wars on civilians as well as on their own 
soldiers on television.  
During the Vietnam War, people started demonstrating their concern bout war’s 
effects more effectively. This forced decision makers to find new ways to decrease 
3 
casualties. The low casualty rates in the Gulf War set a new standard [Ref. 3]. However, 
even with this new standard, community concern for casualties has not stopped. Although 
the number of casualties in an entire contemporary war is less than the number of losses 
suffered in one day in WWII, war still poses a great risk for decision makers who do not 
want to lose their positions. This fact led to new studies for predicting the number of 
casualties and developing new technologies for reducing the number of casualties.  The 
latter caused the invention of smart, highly technological weapon systems that cause less 
collateral damage and acceptable personnel protection, so as to increase the probability of 
survival given a hit.  
Governments now sponsor institutions to find models to predict the numbers of 
casualties. Thus, they have an analytical way to compare the positives and negatives of 
their actions. The Israel Armed Forces Medical Corps were the first to use these models. 
After studying the Arab-Israeli war, they established models to predict casualties. With 
the help of these models, they decreased the numbers of casualties by assigning more 
medical units to the places where more casualties were expected. Although medical 
planners were the first to use these models, today mostly force planners and decision 
makers use these models.  
1. The Dupuy Institute Study (TDI)  
The Dupuy Institute (TDI) and its founding father, Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, have 
issued many books, data and researches on military history. Col. Dupuy, who wrote over 
80 books about military history and tactics, tried to increase the effectiveness of models 
during his analysis of military history in order to find patterns and trends. With the help 
of these findings, he hoped to find a basis to win the next war. As a non-profit 
corporation the Dupuy Institute followed this path. It has authored numerous reports and 
studies for the U.S. Army.  
The study “Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities” [Ref. 4] is one of the 
recent studies of the differences between urban and non-urban operations. TDI collected 
its own data from the WWII European Theater of Operations (ETO), and verified the 
accuracy of the data by looking at the records of the two sides. This thesis will employ 
these data as well. 
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The data were selected in such a way that each army involved in these battles 
(U.S., U.K., Canadian, Soviet and German) had doctrines similar to those of the U.S. 
Army; no significant difference exists among them [Ref. 4]. The human factors are not of 
much concern according to an initial study [Ref. 2]. In that study, TDI compared combat 
effectiveness, primarily the casualty effectiveness, and concluded that human factors 
remained the same throughout the time frame this data concerns. They also concluded 
that the level of engagement is an important factor and they selected division-level 
operations as the basis of their study. 
Since the selected forces were similar and the engagements happened during the 
same time period, the analysts assumed that there were no differences in technology and 
performance, or at least, that the differences remained constant. This allowed the 
conclusion that differences between urban and non-urban engagements are indeed 
dependent on terrain. TDI analyzed the differences between the force ratios, outcome, 
casualty rates, duration of combat, width of advance and linear density for each type of 
terrain and attacker. 
One of the conclusions of the TDI study, which is important for the scope of this 
thesis, is: 
...the attacker casualties in the urban engagements are less that in the non-
urban engagements and the casualty exchange ratio favors the attacker as 
well. Because of the selection of the data, there is some question whether 
these observations can be extended beyond this data, but it does not 
provide much support to the notion that urban combat is a more intense 
environment than non-urban combat. 
This conclusion may look counter-intuitive. However, there may be several 
factors which lead to that conclusion. One is the difference in the manner in which the 
opposing forces reported casualties. Although Americans reported the severely wounded 
as well as the lightly and the moderately wounded, Germans normally reported only those 
sent to army-level hospitals, thus excluding most of the lightly wounded and some of the 
moderately wounded in the casualty reports.  
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One hypothesis is that the defenders did not use the advantages of the urban area. 
Those forces defended their cities in a conventional style as if they were defending a non-
urban area. That might also lead to the lower number of casualties for the attacker.  
Another reason could be the devastating examples of defending cities for the city 
itself. Defending forces might have given up fighting when they felt that they could not 
hold the city and withdrew to avoid the destruction of the city and its resources. 
The last reason, which maybe the most important, is the concept that attacking is 
the ultimate way to gain objectives. The main principle for conducting defense is to 
provide enough time for friendly forces to gather and reorganize forces for attack. 
Following this principle, a defender’s main effort should be to delay an attacker’s 
advance to gain time instead of destroying attacking forces.  
2. Bracken’s Attrition Models of the Ardennes Campaign and 
Lanchester Equations  
Bracken’s study [Ref. 5] focuses on the Ardennes Campaign for which there is 
reliable and complete daily data available. Bracken’s study differs from TDI’s studies in 
the manipulation of data. Unlike the authors of the TDI study, Bracken computes the 
combat power of each side by giving weight to each weapon system according to its 
combat effectiveness. He uses this weighted combat power to calculate the force ratio.  
Like TDI, Bracken assumes all American soldiers are the same, which means they 
all have the same properties, but includes weapons in his calculations. Since he calculates 
the combat power by weighting each element (e.g. tank, soldier, carrier), all his models 
are homogenous.  
This study reveals that although the personal effectiveness of an Allied soldier is 
greater than that of a German soldier, the total German force was as effective as Allied 
forces. This is consistent with the Dupuy Institute’s conclusions that none of the forces is 
different. Moreover, Bracken proposes that the attacker always has an advantage over the 
defender.  
Bracken’s study concludes that a Lanchester linear model fits the Ardennes 
campaign. The Lanchester linear model assumes that the casualty rate of a force is 
proportional to the product of its force size and enemy’s force size. A famous maxim of 
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Lanchester’s linear law is that the size of the forces matter a great deal as if to confirm 
Voltaire’s famous saying, “God is always on the side of big battalions.” As a 
deterministic model, Lanchester linear model inputs into to the formula the size and 
attrition rate for each side to predict who will win.  
Since it is a deterministic model, it always gives the same result, which does not 
reflect real life. As opposed to a stochastic model, which provides results with measures 
of uncertainty, a deterministic model provides only a point estimate, which presents 
diminished utility when applied to actual force variables. It does not reflect the high 
variability of the number of casualties, especially in urban warfare. In an urban 
engagement, given the same conditions, one side may encounter no casualties or lose all 
its forces [Ref. 6]. The data used by this thesis exhibit the same kind of variability in that 
there are cases in which the attacker suffered no casualties and there are cases in which 
the defender lost all combat power. 
3. Faruk Yigit’s Thesis 
In his thesis, Yigit [Ref. 7] studied 3-to-1 ratio, which is considered to be the 
minimum ratio of attacking forces to defending forces to make victory likely and 
evaluated the historical changes in dispersion and casualty rates. He used a variety of 
data, from the Netherlands’ War of Independence in 1600 to the Israel-Lebanon War in 
1982. He examined 532 battles, at varying force levels and tried to determine trends for 
force ratio, dispersion and casualty rates. 
For force ratio (attacker’s manpower divided by defender’s manpower), he 
concludes that historical data supports the 3-to-1 rule of thumb. He found that the higher 
the force ratio, the more likely the attacker wins the battle. Using force ratio as an 
estimator is useful as a gross measure for campaign planning and forecasting the battle 
outcomes. This study also showed that there is no time trend in force ratio.  
In his analysis of dispersion (area per soldier), Yigit realized that dispersion 
exhibited a trend across time. The trend shows that area per man has steadily increased.  
That is most probably the effect of the invention of lethal weapons. “As lethality 
increased, tactics, such as increasing the dispersion of combat forces, were adopted to 
minimize the effectiveness of the enemy’s weapons.”  
7 
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Figure 1.   The Daily Casualty Rates (DCR) for Attacker and Defender [After Ref. 7] 
 
For the daily casualty rate, he went further and looked not only at the historical 
trends but also at the size of units and battles for each campaign in time consequences. 
The conclusions are: 
• Casualty rates have declined over time. 
• The attacker’s casualty rates were usually lower than the defender’s. 
• The daily casualty rate increases as unit size decreases. 
• Battle outcomes are more probabilistic than deterministic. 
C. THE IMPACT OF URBAN TERRAIN ON OPERATIONS 
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
Cities have always been the centers of social, economical, industrial and political 
powers. Governmental departments, resources, key communication nodes, dense industry 
and labor, most of which are vital to maintaining the functioning of the state and the  
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armed forces, reside in urban areas. It is important for the attacking forces to capture 
these assets not just to break the will of the defender but also to use these assets for 
themselves. Thus, war planners have always thought of cities as “centers of gravity.” 
Additionally, gaining control of a city has a huge psychological impact for people 
because of historical and sentimental ties. One striking example is the German defense of 
Aachen in the late 1944’s. Although Aachen was the first German city attacked, the 
already over-extended German forces defended the city at all costs suffering large 
numbers of casualties. If the city in question is a country’s capital or a major city, thus 
more valuable and meaningful, then its defense is more important. One apparent example 
is the German attack on Stalingrad. Although the Germans knew that attacking Stalingrad 
was not the best course of action, they took the risk of attacking that city because of its 
psychological and strategic importance to each side. 
Since major cities have vital resources, communication nodes and psychological 
importance, they have always been an arena for wars. However, every conventional force 
operating in an urban area has learned that fighting in an urban area poses a set of 
difficulties and challenges usually different from the conventional battle space in which 
they were trained to operate. 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) differs from operations in non-
urban areas because of man-made obstacles. Buildings channel attacking forces towards 
possible planned kill zones or ambushes. Buildings also offer good cover and 
concealment for the defender. Snipers can use this cover very effectively. Also, city 
structure interrupt the command, control and communication chains, which might lead to 
a separation of forces or a lessening of the synergistic effect of the operations.  
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Figure 2.   Vertical Nature of the Battlefield in Urban Areas [From Ref. 8] 
 
The “vertical” nature of a city adds another dimension to the difficulty of 
conducting MOUT. In addition to above-ground constructions such as multi-story 
buildings, underground constructions, such as sewer systems, pose extra threats and 
demand added attention from each soldier performing the operation, contributing combat 
fatigue. High buildings grant good observation and fire positions. Also, they provide 
antitank weapons the ability to attack armored vehicles from above, their usual point of 
weakness. An attack on the rear or flank, which is usually more effective, can come from 
the underground systems. 
The complex nature of streets provides advantages to the defending forces who 
are generally more familiar with the city. City structure also provides an excellent 
environment for the execution of hit-and-run types of guerilla warfare. Blocking of 
streets is more effective in an urban area than it is in a non-urban area, since in a city it 
generally is not possible to circumnavigate the obstacles.  
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The high density of civilians in cities is another factor affecting MOUT and 
normally restricts the operating forces’ Rules of Engagement (ROE). Forces cannot 
behave as if they are executing in the open area. They have to consider every move they 
make to avoid unexpected consequences. The international community’s growing 
concern about non-combatant casualties, perhaps particularly in the case of non-
governmental organizations and United Nations workers, restricts available combat 
options.  Given today’s immediate media broadcasts from within combat areas, military 
planners attempt to minimize collateral damage that could affect public opinion 
negatively toward that force. 
Using weapons of mass destruction in cities might allow a tactical victory but it 
might also cause a strategic defeat through the loss of public and international support. 
Inconsiderate damage to civilian property and life can alienate the local population and 
prevent the preservation of facilities for future use by attacking forces [Ref. 8]. 
Urban areas can be controlled by clearing every street, every building and every 
cellar, but this makes urban operations manpower-intensive. Also, the denser the forces, 
the greater the casualties. Thus, during the planning phase, it is vital to calculate the 
optimum number of soldiers to achieve objectives while minimizing casualties. 
One other factor that affects MOUT is the variation of tactics used by the forces. 
If one force uses guerilla tactics it becomes harder for the other force to differentiate 
combatants from non-combatants. On the other hand, guerilla warfare is often the only 
method for forces inferior in number and technology to defend themselves. Experience 
has verified that the hit-and-run technique is not only good in non-urban areas but also in 
urban areas. 
Combat in cities also affects the organization of forces. For example, armored 
vehicles need strong infantry support to operate in urban areas. Urban areas also restrict 
the use of some types of ammunitions and equipment, such as flamethrowers and 
artillery, which are in the organic structure of the conventional forces. Instead, forces 
may need bulldozers or guided munitions. 
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It is not wise to use non-urban tactics in urban operations. MOUT needs special 
training and tactics. If forces do not practice these tactics during peacetime, they have to 
learn the tactics through experience on the battlefield. 
D. OBJECTIVES  
A number of questions arise for data analysts as the analysis of urban operations 
becomes more important. One obvious question is how to identify the differences 
between urban and non-urban areas. Differences between tactics, equipment, force 
organizations and psychological effects are the first ones to consider. This thesis 
examines if daily casualty rates for the attacker forces in urban and non-urban 
engagements differ. The next step will be to identify the important factors and their 
effects on the attacker’s daily casualty rate (DCR). 
Another objective of this thesis is to find a model that could be used to predict the 
casualty rate for an engagement under the same assumptions. Due to rapid development 
and employment of technology, especially in military technology, models based on 
historical data may not produce reliable estimates for contemporary use. However, these 
results may provide bounds for the attacker’s DCR, and thus, help in planning their 
human needs and the organization of their forces. 
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
Due to the multi-dimensional nature of war and a lack of complete data, studies 
cannot go further without some assumptions. This study is no exception. 
It is assumed that each force has the same doctrine as the others or at least that the 
differences are constant. Bracken’s study also makes this assumption. This assumption is 
supported by the Capture Rate Study of The Dupuy Institute [Ref. 2]. This study 
concludes that the combat effectiveness of U.S. and German forces were equal and the 
German forces were 20 to 50 percent more effective than those of the U.K. and Canada. 
German forces were also rated better than the Soviets in combat effectiveness. Due to the 
small number of cases where U.K. and Canadians fought against the Germans, the 
Germans advantage in combat effectiveness can be ignored. However, there are many 
data points for engagements between Soviets and Germans. The assumption is that the 
difference in the combat effectiveness between Germans and Soviets remained the same.  
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Although another assumption is that the combat effectiveness of all countries is 
equal or the difference is constant, the analysis uses a nationality factor to capture any 
differences among nations. 
Reliance on WWII data to represent all the engagements occurring before or later, 
and in different areas, is another big assumption. However, considering that the main 
principles of war have hardly changed for centuries, the results of this thesis will still be 
enlightening.  
One limitation of this study is the absence of technological factors. Due to the 
aforementioned assumption, technological advances will not be considered. Hence, this 
requires excluding the effects of airplanes, missiles and so forth.  
It is not possible to infer any conclusion about the effectiveness of the Navy and 
Air Force in MOUT because of their lack of experience in urban operations.  
All the engagements are selected from division-level engagements. Thus, the 
conclusion may not fit for lower-level engagements, such as those of battalion and 
company levels. It is likely that casualty rates would be greater in the lower-level units 
than the higher-level units as the latter contains a higher proportion of combat support 
and combat service support elements. Yigit’s thesis [Ref. 7] also supports this finding. 
However, this thesis will not seek to discover if the conclusions change according to the 
level of operations. 
Since a validated model does not exist to compare a Soviet T-34, German Panther 
and an American Sherman tank, this thesis did not use any weighting techniques to 
calculate combat power for attackers and defenders nor the force ratio. Thus, the attacker 
and defender strength and force ratio is calculated using the number of personnel, 
excluding the number or quality of armor, artillery and aircraft in the model.  
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Unlike most studies, this thesis will not try to ascertain the “outcome” of the 
battle. It will not answer the question, “who will win?” This study will differ from the 
previous studies in two aspects: it will discriminate between urban and non-urban 
engagements and it will try to discover an answer to the question, “what is the expected 
attacker’s daily casualty rate?”   
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The main purpose of this study is to determine if the daily casualty rates are 
different for urban and rural engagements in division-level engagements. The following 
questions are relevant to this determination: 
• Which factors are statistically significant for predicting casualties? 
• Who suffers more casualties? 
• What is the best method to estimate the daily casualty rate?  
• Do urban engagements result in more casualties? 
Answers to these questions already exist in some form. They can be found in 
military manuals and other studies. However, they could give different answers to the 
same question. This is normal because of the different assumptions and high number of 




























II. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis utilizes the data used for the study “Measuring the Effects of Combat 
in Cities: Phase I and II.” The data were collected for the two-phased study completed in 
June 2003. These data consist of 253 engagements between the Soviet Union, the United 
States, Canada and the U.K. against Germany in WWII between 1943 and 1944. The 
availability of numerous reliable data resulted in the selection of these years and places.  
These data are enhanced by 111 engagements recently added to the existing 
DLEDB. The Dupuy Institute added these engagements to the study after a two-year 
research. The Dupuy Institute claims that all data come from original unit records, the 
U.S. National Archives, the British Public Records Office, the Federal German Archives, 
the Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section and the Russian Military Archives 
[Ref. 4: 7-10, Ref. 9:6-10]. 
The data consist of both continuous variables and categorical variables with up to 
nine levels. Most of the variables are objective results derived from the archives of the 
forces. Nevertheless, there are also subjective variables derived from the researchers’ 
judgments, though only one of those subjective variables will be used in this thesis. 
Precisely speaking, “Terrain” which is judged according to a set of rules created 
beforehand, will be the only subjective element in the analysis. The “data description” 
section provides more details.  
Figure 3 represents a quick look at the data. It shows the number of engagements 
for each force and the terrain. One notable issue is the absence of data for Germans 
attacking Allied forces in urban areas. Thus, to analyze German operations on urban 
terrain, it is necessary to rely on German attacks on Russian forces. As Soviet, U.S., U.K. 
and Canadian forces were allies during WWII, no data appear for engagements among 
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Figure 3.   Content of Data 
 
Another significant aspect of the graph is that in German versus Allied 
engagements, the Germans were usually the defender. Conversely, among engagements 
between Germans and Soviets, the Germans were usually the attacker. 
 
Attacker Defender Urban Rural Total 
Allied German 46 64 110 
Soviet German 23 18 41 
German Allied 0 27 27 
German Soviet 28 47 75 
Total  97 156 253 
 
Table 1. Content of Data 
Out of 253 engagements, 156 occurred in non-urban areas and the remaining 97 
occurred in urban areas. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The original data consist of 26 columns. The first six columns provide 
information about who fought against whom, where, when and for how long. The next 
two columns are based on the outcome of the engagement, a subjective determination. 
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The rest of the data presents the facts of the engagement, giving the number of personnel, 
advance rate, total casualties, daily casualty rates, attacker’s front width and linear 
density (number of attacking soldiers per kilometer in the front). The last part of the data 
consists of the total and daily armor losses for each side. 
Some data are missing on the daily advance rate, attacker’s front width and linear 
density. For armor loss, most data are missing.  
In addition to the high number of variables, the high variability of each variable 
affects any outcome of a model using these variables. For this reason, it is difficult to 
predict the outcome of a battle with confidence. Table 2 shows the range and variability 
of some variables present in the data.  
 
Variable Min Max Max/Min 
Attacker Strength 5600 67829 12.11 
Defender Strength 358 57089 159.47 
Attacker's Front Width (Km.) 1 203.65 203.65 
Linear Density ((men in Km.) 203.65 19322.08 94.88 
Force Ratio 0.4 45.53 113.83 
 
Table 2. Variability of Data 
 
For convenience, some abbreviations are created in order to understand the codes 
and variables. Throughout the entire study, variables beginning with “X” denote the 
attacker. Thus, XCasualty refers to the attacker’s casualty rate. “Y” denotes the defender, 
and YStrength indicates the defender’s strength.  
1. Independent Variables 
The independent variables are those which are assumed to be known by the 
attacker at the beginning of the engagements. Thus, the strengths of forces, length of the 
front line, force ratio, terrain and the nationality of forces are considered independent 





a. Attacker’s Strength (XStrength) 
The attacker’s strength is the sum of the number of troops subject to 
enemy fire including combat support and combat service support elements at the 
beginning of the engagement. This number does not include the number of tanks, artillery 
and so forth. 
As seen from Figure 4, the distribution of attacker’s strength is right skewed. The 
mean is 24257 and the median is 19032.  The great difference between the mean and 
median is expected due to the number of extreme outliers. Extreme outliers are 
observations which are more distant from the median than 1.35 times the difference 
between the first and third quartile. 
 















































Figure 4.   Explanatory Plots of Attacker’s Strength 
 
b. Defender’s Strength (YStrength)  
This is the number of defending personnel in the field. It does not include the 
number of artillery, tanks or planes. The distribution of defender’s strength is also right 
skewed with extreme outliers, which causes the mean to be larger than the median. 
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However, the defender’s strength is not as dispersed as the attacker’s strength. Since all 
elements were considered homogenous, no weights were given to any particular forces 
while calculating the attacker and defender’s strength. See Figure 5. 
 









































Figure 5.   Explanatory Plots of Defender’s Strength 
 
c. Attacker’s and Defender’s Country (XCountry, YCountry) 
XCountry and YCountry are categorical variables with three levels: 
German, Allied and Soviet. Due to the limited number of U.K. and Canadian 
engagements, these countries are included with U.S. engagements. The name “Allied” 
forces encompasses all the engagements consisting of U.S., U.K., and Canadian forces. 
By including country variables, the expectation was to increase the ability 
to explain their effectiveness as well as to decrease the variability. As mentioned in TDI 
Study [Ref. 4], Allied forces usually attacked urban objectives with more troops and the 
Soviets defended their cities with more troops. Thus, it was plausible to expect a country 
and a terrain interaction term in this analysis. 
Some additional facts must be mentioned. No information illustrating 
German attack on Allied forces in urban area exists. Additionally, while Germans were 
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generally the defender against allied forces, they were generally the attacker against the 
Soviets. However, these results purely rely on the available data. It might not be 
generalized, since it includes a specific time period, namely, 1943 and 1944. 
d. Attacker’s Front Width in Kilometers (XFrontWidth) 
This is the length of the front line for the attacking force measured in 
kilometers. These measurements are generally derived from the operations plans of that 
force. Thus, it might be slightly different from the actual due to changes during the 
execution of the operation. The term “Attacker’s Front Width” makes it easier to 
understand the density of the forces. 
As with other numerical variables, this variable is also right skewed. 
However, compared to the previous variables, this one has fewer extreme outliers. 
Attacking forces are generally assigned 12 km. of the front line. However, because the 
variable is skewed to the right, the average is higher.  
 






Histogram of Attacker's Front Width





Boxplot of Attacker's Front Width
Attacker's Front Width in km.  





e. Linear Density (XMenFront) 
Linear density is a derived continuous variable indicating the number of 
personnel relative to the front width. It is calculated by dividing the attacker’s total 
strength (XStrength, defined above) by the attacker’s front width (XFrontWidth, defined 
above), where XStrengthXMenFront
XFrontWidth
= .  This concept is known as dispersion in the 
military. It is one of the main considerations when planning a tactical movement, 
especially when selecting the movement technique.  
After more accurate and lethal weapons were employed on the battlefield, 
military planners emphasized the dispersion of troops to decrease the effectiveness of 
these weapons. Thus, from a cost-effectiveness perspective, using expensive highly 
technological weapons against a highly dispersed enemy is not recommend, especially if 
the campaign is expected to be long-lived, all other things being equal.  
Table 3 clearly demonstrates the trend in the density. The linear density 
has decreased steadily over time, however, the slope of decrease in linear density is 
steeper in non-urban areas, indicating greater dispersion.  
 








Density in all 
Terrain 
100000 4970 3883 32 25 
Density in  
Urban Terrain 
16300 46400 11600 1300 1100 
 
Table 3. Battlefield Density Throughout the Ages [From Ref. 10] 
 
f. Total Strength Ratio (Force Ratio) 
Force ratio is another derived continuous variable. It is calculated by 
dividing the attacker’s strength (XStrength) by the defender’s strength (YStrength), 
where, XStrengthForceRatio
YStrength
= , indicates the relative strength of attacking forces. 
Therefore, the attacker outnumbers the defender if the force ratio is bigger than 1. Force 
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ratio is one of the most dispersed variables in the data set as seen in Figure 7. Its range is 
[0.4, 45.53]. A close look at the data shows that most of the extreme outliers are from 
allied forces attacking Germans in urban terrain.  
 






























Figure 7.   Dispersion of Force Ratio 
 
The variation of force ratio should be related to the principle of force 
economy and establishing a main effort area. It is normal to see a higher ratio for a 
division, which is the main effort of a higher command. It is also normal to see lower 
force ratios for divisions whose orders are to disguise themselves and separate the enemy.  
2. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, also called the response variable, is the one desired to be 
predicted using independent variables. In this case, the dependent variable is the 
attacker’s casualty rates. 
The attacker’s daily casualty rate is a continuous dependent variable. It is 
calculated by dividing the total number of attacker’s casualties by the product of total  
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strength at the beginning and the duration of the engagement. It is also right-skewed with 
a range between 0 and 8.59 percent. Although on average, the attacker lost 1.07 percent 
of its strength daily, the median loss was 0.65 percent. 
 
Figure 8 shows the variability of the attacker’s casualty rate. It implies that 
attackers could suffer occasional unexpected or high casualties. Attacker’s lost at most 
8.59 percent of their beginning strength.  This variable, like the others, is right-skewed. 
One important point is the presence of some observations with a zero casualty rate. 
 







Histogram of Attacker's DCR






Boxplot of Attacker's DCR
Attacker's Daily Casualty Rate  
 
Figure 8.   Variability of Attacker’s Casualty Rate 
 
C. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This section focuses on the effects of terrain for each independent variable. We 
will treat the available data as if it constitutes a random sample from a hypothetical 
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population of WWII battles. Conclusions will be drawn from graphs and two-sample 
tests. The values for urban engagements will compose one sample and values for the non- 
urban the other sample. There are two methods for making inferences based on two-
samples: parametric and nonparametric tests. Nonparametric tests are also known as 
distribution-free tests.  
1. Parametric Two-Sample Tests 
Parametric two-sample tests look for the difference between the means of the two 
samples. Parametric tests assume that samples come from a specific distribution and are 
used to test hypotheses and to determine confidence intervals. Tests of hypotheses consist 
of a null hypothesis (the prior belief) 0H  and an alternative hypothesis aH . Only if the 
sample evidence strongly contradicts the null hypothesis is an alternative hypothesis 
accepted.  
The null hypothesis states that the difference between the means of attacker’s 
daily casualty rate in urban and non-urban areas equals zero. The populations are 
indistinguishable if the test results fail to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, it is possible to 
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If the distributions are normal and the variances of the population known, 
inferences about the sample and a confidence interval are determined by using z tests.  
If those assumptions are not true, the next thing is to look at the sample sizes. For 
sufficiently large samples, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) guarantees that the 
difference between the mean has approximately a normal distribution. In practice, the 
CLT is often used when both sample sizes are greater than 40 [Ref. 11]. If one of the 
sample sizes is less than 40 or if the standard deviation of the population is unknown, 
assuming they are normal distributed, a two-sample t test should be used to make 










+ where 0∆ is the difference between the mean daily casualty rate , which is 
zero in this case, and 1s is the standard deviation of the sample. 
As seen in “data description,” all variables are right-skewed. Thus, it is not 
appropriate to use z tests. With 96 observations for urban and 153 for non-urban 
engagements, it is then feasible to assume that CLT assures that the difference between 
the means of the two samples is normally distributed. Thus, the analysis of the thesis’s 
hypotheses will use t tests. 
2. Nonparametric Tests 
Unlike t or z tests, nonparametric tests do not require the assumption of normal 
distribution. Since they do not require that the data come from any parametric distribution 
family, they are called distribution-free tests. 
If it is not possible to use a t test because the sample size is small or the 
distribution is not normal, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is used to analyze hypotheses 
[Ref. 11:p. 659]. To use this test, each sample is assumed to come from a continuous 
distribution with the same shape and spread. However, the means might be different. In 
null hypothesis, the assumption is that the difference between the means ( )1 2,µ µ of the 
samples is zero. The alternative hypothesis will be that the difference is not zero.  In this 
analysis 1µ  will denote the samples from the urban operations and 2µ will denote the 
samples from the non-urban operations. 
The following section will attempt to ascertain whether urban operations are 
different from non-urban operations by analyzing each independent variable in each 
terrain type. The null hypothesis is rejected if the calculated test statistic is less than 0.05. 
Table 4 shows the results of the t and Wilcoxon test and the mean of each 
predictor variable in each terrain type. The results indicate that attacker’s strength, linear 
density and attacker’s front width are not statistically significant. That is to say, in the 
presence of the other variables, including these variables are not necessary. The mean of 
each variable exhibits the characteristics of urban warfare. On average, each country used 
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bigger force size and higher force ratio and linear density in urban operations. Defending 
country used less force in urban areas or they defended in urban areas when they did not 
have enough force to defend in non-urban area.  
 
p-values Estimated Mean in 
  t Test Wilcoxon Test Urban Non-Urban 
XStrength 0.3317 0.1299 25370 23565 
YStrength 0.0004 0.0213 10561 14119 
XMenFront 0.4295 0.8935 2347 2095 
XFrontWidth 0.1779 0.7981 14.30 15.98 
ForceRatio 0.0294 0.0005 3.747 2.339 
XCasualty 0.0144 0.1162 0.844 1.212 
YCasualty 0.0023 0.0012 14.36 4.988 
Table 4. Test Results 
 
3. Independent Variables and Terrain 
a. Attacker’s Strength and Terrain 
The extreme outliers in the urban section of the plots are caused by the 
overwhelming power the U.S. VIII Corps used in the engagements of Brest in September 
1944. In these engagements, Allied forces used 60,000 personnel on average, which is 
almost three times higher than the mean of all engagements in an urban area. 
For non-urban operations, the outliers are also mostly attributed to U.S. 
attacks on German forces. Thus, it is possible to conclude that Allied forces tended to use 
extensive force more frequently than both German and Soviet forces, possibly because of 
available manpower or the effective use of what the military calls as the “main effort 
principle.” 
The histogram in Figure 9 shows that the attacker’s strength in urban and 
non-urban operations does not come from a normal distribution. The heavy tail on the 
right side supports this assumption. However, since there are more than 40 data points in 
each sample, it is possible to assume that the difference between the means of the 
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Figure 9.   Histogram of Attacker’s Strength Given Terrain 
 
Since the sample size is higher than 40, the large sample test is used. The 
result of the test rules out rejecting oH , which means that there is no discernible 
difference between the attacker’s average strength in urban and non-urban areas and this 
is confirmed by the Wilcoxon test. Since the data consist of division-level engagements, 
it is difficult to confirm or refute the assumption that urban operations need more 
manpower simply by assessing the attacker’s strength. Only the Allied forces used more 
strength in urban operations compared to non-urban engagements. While the force 
strengths of Allies and Germans were nearly equivalent, the Soviets used more strength 
for non-urban engagements. 
b. Defender’s Strength and Terrain 
It is often assumed that defenders use urban areas as a battleground if they 
assess that they do not possess enough forces to defend non-urban area. This might be 
considered in order to avoid the destruction of the cities, civilian lives and resources. It 
was also previously mentioned that inferior forces use urban areas as a battleground 
because of its advantages. 
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Figure 10 supports this idea. The average number of defenders in urban 
engagements seems to be smaller than the number of defenders in non-urban 
engagements.  The urban engagements contain no outliers. However, a careful look at the 
data indicates that the Soviet defense of Kharkov and the German defenses in Cherbourg 
and in Aachen were implemented with a higher number of personnel than other urban 
engagements. Since those cities were critical to the flow of the entire campaign, the 
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Figure 10.   Histogram of Defender’s Strength Given Terrain 
 
In non-urban operations, the number of defending personnel varies much 
more. The extreme outliers are primarily Soviet defenses in non-urban engagements. It is 
plausible that the Soviets defended themselves with a large number of men because of 
available personnel. 
A two-sided large sample test shows that the mean number of defenders in 
urban engagements is significantly different from the mean number of defenders in non-
urban engagements. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test also supports that analysis. 
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It is generally known that urban areas include many resources. Since 
neither defender nor attacker wants to destroy the resources of urban areas, both tend to 
avoid urban engagements. However, when the defender did not have enough forces to 
defend a non-urban area, they used urban areas as a battleground. 
c. Attacker’s Front Width and Terrain 
As urban areas are generally rich in industrial and personnel resources, 
they are considered centers of gravity. Thus, one might expect to see less front width for 
the forces attacking urban areas. Figure 11 shows the distribution of attacker’s front 
width in each type of terrain. Although the distributions of both samples are almost the 
same, non-urban engagements include an extreme outlier. This extreme outlier is the 
Soviets attack on the German forces north of Kharkov. All the extreme outliers for non-
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Figure 11.   Histograms of Attacker’s Front Width (in km) Given Terrain 
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A large sample two-sided test shows that the difference between the 
means of the samples can not be distinguished from zero. Thus, the front width does not 
change according to the terrain. The Wilcoxon test agrees with this result. 
d. Linear Density and Terrain 
There are two opposing ideas about linear density in operations. The first 
one proposes that since urban areas provide good concealment and cover for the 
defender, it is a good idea to disperse more when attacking urban areas. The opposite 
posits that a force is not strong anywhere if its forces are dispersed everywhere. Military 
planners normally consider the balance between these as an important concern for all 
operations. 
The last two pages concluded that the attacker’s strength and front width 
do not change for each type of terrain. The expectation is that linear density, the ratio 
between attacker’s strength to the width of front line, does not change according to the 
terrain. 
Figure 12 shows that each sample comes from a similar distribution, with 
a couple of extreme outliers on the right-hand tail. The only extreme outlier for urban 
engagements is from a Soviet attack at Prudyanka. All the extreme outliers in non-urban 
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Figure 12.   Histograms of Attacker’s Linear Density Given Terrain 
 
A large sample test fails to reject the null hypothesis. This means that the 
difference between the population means might be zero. In other words linear density did 
not change according to the terrain. Partitioning the above graph indicated that the linear 
density of the Soviet forces was almost the same for every attack they conducted, 
construed as Soviets being more consistent when planning their operations. 
e. Force Ratio 
The force ratio is the ratio of the attacker’s strength to the defender’s 
strength. Previous analyses showed that while the attacker’s strength has no relationship 
to the terrain, the defender’s strength is related. Thus, it is expected that the force ratio 
change according to the terrain.  
Figure 13 shows that the mean and median of the two samples are 
different and possibly higher in urban areas. There is more than one severe outlier in both 
samples. The severe outliers in urban operations are attributed to the Allied forces attacks 
on Germans. Although there are limited number of Canadian and U.K. operations, most 
of these severe outliers are the result of their engagements. German forces also attacked  
32 
with high force ratios that make up some of the outliers in urban engagements. However, 
all outliers in non-urban engagements are attributed to German attacks on the Soviets. 
The Soviets did not use force ratios higher than 6:1.  
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Figure 13.   Boxplot of Force Ratio Given Terrain 
 
A one-sided large sample test where the alternative hypothesis means that 
force ratio in urban operations is higher than it is non-urban operations rejects the null 
hypothesis. In other words, the mean of the force ratio in urban operations is higher than 
non-urban operations. The Wilcoxon test supports this finding. This conclusion also 
agrees with the common interpretation of urban operation in the way that these operations 
need more manpower. 
4. Dependent Variables and Terrain 
a. Attacker’s Daily Casualty Rate and Terrain 
Military Strategy books typically mentioned that planners must avoid 
urban operations because they consume a great number of resources including manpower. 
Moreover, urban operations are normally expected to beget higher casualty rates. 
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However, the boxplot contradicts these findings. It indicates that non-
urban casualty rates are possibly higher and exhibit more variation. The German and 
Soviet forces suffered a high number of casualties when attacking in non-urban 
engagements. However, only the Soviets experienced extreme losses in urban operations.  
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Figure 14.   Boxplot of Attacker’s Daily Casualty Rate Given Terrain and Country 
 
A one-sided large sample test shows that the difference between the means 
of two samples is not the same. It means the attacker’s urban casualty rate is lower, on 
average, than the non-urban casualty rate. On the other hand, the Wilcoxon test does not 
support this conclusion. However, since the number of sample sizes is at least twice the 




b. Defender’s Daily Casualty Rate and Terrain 
Because of the excellent concealment and cover opportunities in urban 
operations, fewer casualties for the defender are expected. However, in summary 
statistics (Appendix II), it appears that the defender’s daily casualty rate in urban 
engagements is actually higher than in non-urban engagements. This is true for both the 
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Figure 15.   Defender’s Daily Casualty Rate Given Terrain 
 
A large one-sided two-sample test shows the differences in means are not 
zero.  In other words the mean daily casualty rate of defender in urban engagements is 
higher. The Wilcoxon test is consistent with that analysis. 
D. DISCUSSION 
One concern arises after these analyses: why are the defender’s daily casualty 
rates higher in urban operations given the apparent advantages of fighting in urban areas?  
One factor leading that result is the higher force ratios of the attackers in those 
engagements. Actually, these high force ratios are not the result of a higher number of 
attackers but the fewer number of defenders.  
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Another factor affecting the higher daily casualty ratios in urban areas is the 
extensive use of non-line-of-sight weapons such as artillery and mortars. Forces had more 
leeway in implementing ROE in WWII than they do today.  
Aerial bombardment against cities contributed to higher destruction and casualties 
as depicted in Figure 16. Bombers turned the cities into rubble, killing many civilians in 
addtion to military personnel [Ref. 13]. Thus, it is possible that a high daily defender 




Figure 16.   Aachen After Battle [From Ref. 12] 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The type of terrain does not affect the attacker’s strength. However, relative to the 
other forces, Allied forces used more power in urban engagements. For non-urban  
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operations, the Soviet forces had more strength relative to the others. These balanced the 
differences between the attacker’s force strengths in urban and non-urban operations. 
These differences will be analyzed more deeply in the next chapter. 
The defender’s force strength is generally less in urban operations. This supports 
the idea that inferior forces prefer using urban areas. On the other hand, Allied forces 
were the only forces that defended with more personnel in urban engagements. 
In general, the attacker’s front width does not change according to the terrain.  
Unlike the Germans and Soviets, the Allied forces used a wider front line in urban 
engagements. Linear density is not different for each type of terrain. However, Allied 
forces were the only forces possessing a higher linear density in urban engagements. 
There is a statistically significant difference in force ratios when we compare 
urban and non-urban engagements. Force ratios in urban operations are higher than in 
non-urban operations. Allied forces had higher force ratios in urban engagements relative 
to German and Soviet force ratios.  
The attacker’s daily casualty rate is higher for all forces in non-urban operations, 
but the defender’s daily casualty rate is higher in urban operations. However, the Allied 
forces had higher casualty ratios in urban areas relative to the other forces’ casualty 
ratios. 
These findings yield one other conclusion. The manner in which Allied forces 
behaved in urban operations is different from the behavior of German and Soviet forces. 
When attacking in an urban environment, Allied forces used more forces and a wider 
front line resulting in a higher linear density and force ratio. While defending in urban 
operations, unlike the others, the Allied forces used more troops and suffered more daily 
casualties than in non-urban operations. Thus, the Allied forces differ from the Germans 





This chapter uses “Multivariate Linear Regression” to predict the daily casualty 
rates for the attacker. In order to achieve this result, first, linear regression is explained. 
Second, the reason for selecting linear regression is discussed. Next, the models are 
constructed, and finally, the conclusions presented. 
Linear regression assumes that a linear relation exists between a continuous 
response variable and the predictor variables plus noise. In other words, the response 
variable is a linear combination of predictor variables. If only one predictor variable 
exists, the model is called “simple linear regression.” It is called multiple regression if 
there is more than one predictor variable.  
Linear regression gives an expected value for the response variable by using the 
given values of predictor variables.  Since the expected value is given, it might differ 
from the actual value. It is assumed that this difference is random.  A general 
representation of multiple linear regressions appears below. 
0 1 1 2 2 ... k kY x x xβ β β β ε= + + + + +  [Ref. 11] 
Y represents the actual value of the observation. If the random error (residual)ε  is 
not included, then the expected value of the response variable is calculated. Assume that 
the random errors are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a constant variance 2σ . 
Although the researcher knows the values of ix s, the coefficients of this variable, iβ ’s, are 
unknown. 
Linear regression tries to fit a line through the data by using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). OLS finds the iβ s which minimizes the sum of the squared residuals. 
OLS return the optimal line in this sense.  
Although linear regression gives the optimal linear combination of predictor 
variables for estimating the response variables, the OLS assumptions must be checked to 
ensure the results are useful. First, the analyst verifies if the residuals come from a 
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normal distribution with a constant variance (homoscedasticity) 2σ . OLS guarantees that 
the mean will be zero.  The best way to check for normality is to look at the residual vs. 
fitted values plot and quantile to normal plot of residuals. There should not be a pattern in 
the plots. 
It is important to notice that we don’t require the response to be normally 
distributed; instead we assume that the errors, the differences between actual values and 
predicted values, are normally distributed. 
Linear regression is also vulnerable to the effects of outliers. Even one outlier 
may change the intercept and slope of the line. In our case, the outliers were examined 
and checked for any inaccuracies. None of the outliers were deleted.  
The original data has problems with the assumptions, for example, 
heteroscedasticity. To overcome this problem of varying variances, we used power 
transformations. Since all the variables are right-skewed, variables are transformed by 
rising to the powers of less than one. Hence, the attacker’s daily casualty is raised to the 
power of 0.3, and the resulting variable called XC3. Although it is not required, it is a 
good idea to transform the predictor variables to reduce influence and heteroscedasticity 
[Ref. 14].  Attacker’s front width and linear density is raised to the power of 0.2 and they 
are named XFrontWidth2 and XMenFront2. 
It is not always appropriate to include all the predictor variables in the model. 
There are search strategies to find the best model given the available predictor variables 
[Ref. 14]. Examining every possible subset of predictor variables takes too much 
calculation time. There are some shortcuts to overcome this problem, such as stepwise 
regression, which possesses two main methods: forward inclusion and backward 
elimination. 
In forward inclusion, a model starts with one variable with the highest correlation 
to the response variable. Next, at each step, it adds another predictor variable, until it can 
no longer decrease the values of Akaike’s criterion, AIC significantly.  AIC shows how 
well the model explains the data with a penalty for complexity [Ref. 14]. 
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In backward elimination, a model starts with all the predictor variables included. 
Then, it tries to delete that variable that reduces AIC maximally. The normal stepwise 
method is a combination of the above two methods. In stepwise regression method, a 
model starts with all predictor variables. It removes the predictor variable, which 
decreases the value of the AIC most. Thereafter, it reintroduces the deleted variables in 
the model and calculates which option decreases the AIC maximally. This loop keeps 
going until adding or dropping a term no longer significantly decreases the value of AIC. 
These models stop when all the variables included in the model are “significant”. In our 
case, we used the stepwise regression by both forward inclusion and backward 
elimination.  
Linear regression developed prior to the computer age. Once the power of 
computers could be harnessed, the applicability of linear regression increased by 
combining it with other methods, such as using transformed data, adding interaction 
terms, which are very hard to do by hand. However, contrary to simple linear regression, 
those new models are mostly complicated and difficult to interpret. On the other hand, 
linear models predict better in situations with small amounts of data and low signal-to-
noise data [Ref. 14].   
Since it is possible to get information about the n’th level of a categorical variable 
given that the subsequent 1n −  levels are known, each categorical variable was 
represented as 1n −  levels in the model instead of n levels. In other words, attacker’s 
country was represented by Allied and Soviet excluding German. 
The building of the models and graphs is done with the S-Plus @ 6.1 for 
Windows application tool. Data rows with missing values for variables were not included 
in the model. Significant variables in a model were selected by the method 
( )stepAIC which can be attached to the S-Plus @ 6.1 from the MASS library for 






B. PREPARATION OF DATA 
1. Transformation of Data 
The previous chapter demonstrated that all the variables are right-skewed 
including the response variables. An appropriate power transformation changes the 
response variable to a nearly normal, or at least to a symmetric shape [Appendix B]. It is 
concluded that raising the attacker’s casualty rate to the power of 0.3 results in the most 
symmetric shapes. In fact, a better transformation for the attacker’s daily casualty rate is 
achieved by taking the natural logarithm of the column. However, since the data has zero 
values (no casualty), computing the logarithm results in “− infinity”. Thus, some 
observations would be lost using this approach. 
Among the predictor variables, only the number of men at the front and the size of 
attacker’s front width are transformed. Although this transformation is not necessary, it 
decreases heteroscedasticity and the number of influential points. After several trials, the 
attacker’s casualty rate was raised to the power of 0.2. 
powertransformed variable = variable  
Attacker’s casualty rate was raised to the power of 0.3 and named XC3, and the 
attacker’s front width and linear density were raised to the power of 0.2 and named 
XFrontWidth2 and XMenFront2 respectively. 
2. Interaction Terms 
Linear regression allows users to add interactions that result from the product of 
predictor variables. Thus, they take into account the effects of one predictor variable 
depending linearly on another predictor variable. This may result in adding a non-
significant variable to the model only because its interaction with another variable is 
significant. During the initial descriptive analyses, it is ascertained that the attacker’s 
strength does not change according to the terrain. However, further analyses showed that 
the attacker’s strength changes for different countries in different terrain. Interaction 
terms capture these details.  
Since it was ascertained that differences existed for the attacker’s strength for 
each country, it is possibly necessary to include the two-way interactions in the model. 
Adding a three-way interaction should provide better results. It is possible that more than 
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two variable interactions affect the attacker’s daily casualty rate. However, including 
more than two-way interaction cause a large decrease in the degrees of freedom and the 
interpretability. Hence, we used two-way interactions in our model. 
Categorical variables in a model affect the regression line differently. Categorical 
variables as the main effect change the intercept. On the other hand, categorical variables 
used as interaction terms affect the slope. Also, the interaction of two categorical variable 
changes the intercept. If the categorical variables are used as the main and interaction 
terms, the slope and the intercept change. Thus, it is possible to find different lines for 
each level of the categorical variables. 
3. Singularity 
Singularity problems occur when one column is the same as another column or a 
linear combination of more than one column. In the case of singularity, it is impossible to 
find the coefficients of the variables. The solution is to find that column and remove it 
from the model. It is possible to believe that deleting an entire column would negatively 
affect the model. This is not correct because the linear combination of the other columns 
provides the same information to the model. 
In the case of this thesis, it is also possible to think that including the attackers 
and defender’s strengths and force ratios cause a singularity problem. Recalling that force 
ratio is the ratio between the other two, it is possible to believe that the likelihood of 
removing the force ratio and obtaining the information from the other two exists. 
However, this is not true. Since force ratio is not a linear combination of the other two, it 
is impossible to get the effects of these variables will be different and it will not cause a 
singularity problem. 
Unexpectedly, singularity occurs when the attacking forces and defending force’s 
countries are evaluated together in the full model with all variables including the two-
way interactions. This happens because of many zero values in the matrix. For example, 
no country attacks its own forces. Thus, the model does not include attacking and 
defending countries together. For simplicity and interpretability reasons, only the 
attackers’ country has been used.  
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However, it is still possible to obtain the information about the defending force by 
only using the attacking forces’ information. Recall that each of the two country variables 
has the same levels, Allied, German, Soviet and there is no data about Allied forces 
attacking the Soviets [Figure 3]. If the attacking country is known, then in two out of 
three cases, the defending country is definitely identified. If the attacking country is 
known to be the Allied or the Soviet, then it is definite that the Germans are the 
defending country. On the other hand, if the Germans are attacking, the identity of the 
defender is unclear. 
Even then, it is still possible to acquire some information about the defender 
during on a German attack. Since the Germans did not attack the Allies in urban areas 
(Figure 3), it is possible to obtain more insight if the terrain is known. If the Germans 
have attacked in an urban area, then it is definite that the Soviets were the defenders. It is 
indeterminate if Germans attacked in non-urban areas, which represents almost 29% of 
the data. 
C. ATTACKER’S DAILY CASUALTY MODEL 
The focus of this section is to construct a linear model able to predict the 
attacker’s daily casualty rate by using the variables. The predictor variables are those that 
should be available before the beginning of the engagement. Among the columns in the 
available data set, the attacker’s nationality, strength, the width of the front line, the 
number of men per km. in front (linear density), the terrain, the defender’s strength and 
force ratio are selected as the predictor variables. Both a model without interactions and a 
model with interactions will be analyzed. 
1. The Model without Interactions 
To find the best model, first, a model with all the transformed variables is used to 
fit the model. Then, using Akaike’s criterion, the preferred model was selected. Residuals 
vs. fitted values, actual values vs. fitted values, Cook’s distance and Quantile-Normal 
help analyze the assumptions.  
The model without the interactions (Appendix D, part A) suggests that the 
inclusion of the defender’s strength and the number of men in front is not significant. 
This is actually not surprising, because in the presence of other variables, these two can  
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be calculated. Thus, the model can derive almost the same results without the defender’s 
strength and the number of men in front. For example, if the force ratio and the attacker’s 
strength is known, then it is very easy to find the defender’s strength. 
There are two influential points (49 and 173) in the model. These two points are 
different from the others. While the first one has higher casualty rates and density, the 
latter has lower casualty rates. Although removing these two points results in a 2% 
improvement in 2R , the coefficients of the model does not change noticeably. In 
addition, Cook’s distances for these are less than 0.05, which means that they do not 
greatly influence the model. The presence of 5 data points with the attacker’s casualty 
rate equal to zero gives the highest error terms which threatens the normality assumption. 
Otherwise, it is possible to assume that the model without interactions agrees with the 
assumptions of OLS. 
However, the model without interactions only explains 26% of the variability 
(Appendix D). The implications of the best model without interactions are, considering 
the other variables remain constant: 
• Given the same terrain, force ratio and front width, the Germans had lower 
casualty rates than the Allies and Soviets. The Soviets had the highest 
casualty rate 
• The attacker’s daily casualty rates are smaller in urban operations than in 
the non-urban ones; 
• The higher the force ratio, the fewer the attacker’s casualties; 
• The higher the front width, the fewer the attacker’s casualties; 
• Among all, the most important variables are the attacker’s country, terrain, 
force ratio, attacker’s strength and front width. 
Although the implications of this model seem reasonable, the noise level is high. 
However, given that this data is real-life data, the 2R seems acceptable.  
The low capability to explain the data also suggests that there might be other 
factors that are not included in the model. Since the data set used all the available 
variables, adding new variables needs detailed work and data collection.  However,  
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adding interactions can help the model. At the end of Chapter II, it is concluded that 
although some variables do not differ according to the terrain, they differ according to the 
terrain and the attacker’s country. Thus, two-way interactions are included in the model. 
2. The Model with Interactions 
The same path is followed to find the best fit for the data set including the 
interaction variables. First, the model started with all predictor variables including the 
two-way interactions. Then, the significant variables were selected by the Akaike 
criterion. Afterwards, the graphs were analyzed to validate the assumptions.   
The model with interactions has 35 variables. By using the Akaike criterion, 11 
are eliminated. Nine observations are deleted because of missing values. Thus, the 
candidate for the best model has 24 predictor variables and an intercept. There are 244 
total degrees of freedom, 219 for residuals.  This model explains 40% percent of the 
variability of the data. This is a 50% improvement in exchange of losing 18 degrees of 
freedom. Since the data set has 244 available data rows, losing 18 degrees of freedom is 






















Figure 17.   Plot of Residuals vs. Fitted Values in the Model with Interactions 
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The plot of residuals versus fitted values (Figure 17) does not show any pattern 
and heteroscedasticity. All data points are gathered around zero. Most of the data points 
are within two standard deviations from the mean. There are five points (labeled) outside 
this range. For a 95% confidence level, the expectation is that more than 12 points are 
outside this range. Thus, these five outliers are not considered a violation of OLS’s 
normality assumption.  
The graph shows that the model has a tendency to underestimate occasionally. For 
outliers, 48 and 107, the reason is the attacker’s success in achieving a low casualty rate 
with a low force ratio. The other outliers 174,175,234 (rows 183,184 and 243 in the data 
set) are the result of the attacker’s high casualty rates although they had the advantage of 
a higher force ratio and small front width. Thus, these unusual engagements appeared as 
outliers. However, these do not affect the assumption that errors are independently and 
identically distributed. The graph also supports the assumption that the variance remained 
constant. 
Figure 18 shows that the assumption of this thesis, that linear regression can be 
used to predict the response variable, is plausible. The graph shows that the fitted values 
are related almost linearly to the actual values. The most influential point is point 228, 
whose Cook’s distance is 0.14. This engagement has the biggest effect on the regression 
line. This engagement occurred between forces with fewer attackers and defenders than 
usual. In addition, the attacker did not lose any personnel in this particular engagement. 
However, deleting this observation does not significantly affect the regression line.  
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Figure 18.   Plot of Actual Transformed Values vs. Predicted Values 
 
This model, as opposed to the model without interactions, includes all the 
predictor variables as the main effects. Although some are not significantly important, 
they are included in the model because of their effects in the interactions.  
This model provides more insight into the operations but it should be viewed 
carefully. It is difficult to make conclusions in a model with interactions and 
transformations. In order to obtain some insight, each variable will be analyzed one by 
one including the variables with which they interact while holding the others constant.  
The primary concern of the analysis in each part is the effects of terrain on DCR 
given the particular variable. Since the terrain interacts with all the numerical predictor 
variables, for each one, it is possible to analyze the effects of terrain.  
3. Effect of the Terrain on the DCR 
In order to analyze the effect of terrain, it is crucial to consider the coefficients of 
the variables with which it is interacting, namely, the force ratio, the attacker’s men in 
front per km. and the width of the front line. Considering that the other variables remain 
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constant, the effect of urban areas will be a number for each level of the other categorical 
variable, that of the attacker’s country. Since Urban interacts with every predictor 
variable but the defender’s strength [Appendix D], the equation that would exhibit the 
effect of the urban terrain is the same as the output at Appendix D except for now the 
value of the intercept is 9.7827 instead of 10.3621. There is also a slight change for the 
coefficient of XFrontWidth2, but it is negligible 
To give the idea about how the terrain affects DCR, values are calculated by using 
the mean of every variable. Figure 19 shows the results. It is obvious that, the difference 
between each terrain type is not a constant number for each country. The DCR is higher 
in non-urban engagements than in urban operations. In addition the difference between 
terrain types for Soviet forces is more significant than it is for Allied and German forces. 
The effect of Urban for Allied and German forces is almost the same. 
 

















Figure 19.   The Effect of Terrain on the DCR 
 
Further analysis presenting a different a perspective is possible. For each country, 
it is possible to find which variables affect this difference. The subtraction of the equation 
for the non-urban engagement from the urban engagement yields the following equation 
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that demonstrates which variables affect the difference due to terrain in DCR for Allied 
forces. The variables that affect the difference for the other forces is the same but their 
coefficients are different. 
3 3 9.2886 0.0234 3.5611 2 1.2877 2non urban urbanXC XC ForceRatio XFrontWidth XMenFront− − = − + − −  
The equation shows that force ratio, front width and linear density have an impact on the 
difference. The difference between the daily casualty rates (DDCR) decreases as the front 
width and linear density increases. However, the effect of these variables cannot be 
examined by fixing the other variables because of the derivation of the data. Using the 
derivation of data as an advantage, the aforementioned equation becomes the following: 
0.2





− = − + − −  
It is easier to interpret this equation. If the attacker and the defender’s strength are 
fixed to their means, the effect of front width becomes clear. As front width increases, the 
difference between the daily casualty rates in terrain decreases. A one-unit increase in the 
defender’s strength increases the difference between the casualty rates. In other words, 
increasing the number of defenders has more impact in the non-urban areas. A similar 
analysis holding the defender’s strength and front width constant gives the following; an 
increase in the attacker’s strength increases the difference between the non-urban 
casualty rate and the urban casualty rate. This also means that increasing the attacker’s 
strength has more effect in non-urban areas. 
Another way to determine whether Urban is significantly important in the model 
is to conduct an F test. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test compares the full model 
with the model without urban-related terms. In this case, the null hypothesis implies that 
Urban is not needed in the model. This also indicates that the attacker’s DCR does not 
change according to the terrain. The result of the ANOVA test leads to the rejection of 
null hypothesis. Thus, Urban is a statistically significant variable in the model and the 
DCR changes according to the terrain. 
4. The Effect of the Attacker’s Country on the DCR 
According to the model, the type of terrain does not make any difference on the 
effect of the attacker’s country to the DCR since an interaction term is not present. The 
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attacker’s strength, front width, and number of men per km. are associated with the daily 
casualty rates. The other variables have the same effect for each country. Fixing the 
variables that XCountry is not interacting made it possible to formulate the relationship 
between the daily casualty rates of Allied, Germans and Soviets forces and the other 
predictor variables. The value of the c is the same for each country. The variables 
XFrontWidth2, XMenFront2 and XStrength produces the differences in DCR for each 
country. 
3 1.6351 1.8657 2 0.8533 2 0.00048AlliedXC XFrontWidth XMenFront XStrength c= + + − +  
3 10.3621 1.2336 2 0.0974 2 0.0005GermansXC XFrontWidth XMenFront XStrength c= − − + +  
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Remembering that front width and linear density are inversely proportional, increasing 
the front width decreases the linear density. However, since both coefficients have the 
same sign, the effect of changing one does not change the conclusion. For allied forces, it 
is expected to see higher casualty rates in higher front widths. On the other hand for 
Germans and Soviets, the daily casualty rate decreases if the front width increases.  The 
attacker’s strength has the same effect on all of them. An increase in the attacker’s 
strength increases the DCRs.  
The above equations do not answer the question: which country has, on average, a 
higher casualty rate? However, it is possible to compare the casualty rates among each 
country. Table 5 exhibits the 95% confidence levels for the differences in the DCR. The 
difference between the German and Allied DCR is not significant. In other words, we 
expect to see the very similar casualty rates for German and Allied forces. On the other 
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hand, German and Allied forces had lower casualty rates relative to Soviet forces. On 
average, Soviet forces had 0.05% more casualty rates than German forces and 0.15% 
more casualty rates than Allied forces. The difference between the Allied and German 
DCRs is not statistically significant. This conclusion agrees with Figure 19. 
 
  Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound 
German-Allied      0.00171 -0.00003 0.02770 
German-Soviet  -0.05246 -0.19996 -0.00533 
Allied-Soviet         -0.14475 -0.68320 -0.00724 
 
Table 5. Difference in the Daily Casualty Rates Between Countries 
 
5. The Effect of the Attacker’s Strength, the Defender’s Strength and 
the Force Ratio on the DCR 
The effect of the attacker’s and defender’s strength and force ratio will be examined 
together because of the way force ratio derived. Usually, the best way to see the effect of 
one variable is to fix the other variables and change the value of the variable concerned. 
However, in this case, it is not possible. Although there is no interaction term between the 
attacker’s strength and force ratio, a change in the attacker’s strength will also change the 
force ratio. Thus, in the analysis for this thesis, it is mandatory to analyze those 
relationships, which will also make the analysis more complicated. For example, 
although the model does not specify an interaction between force ratio and terrain, there 
is an interaction between attacker’s strength and terrain. Therefore it is useful to examine 
the force ratio separately for each terrain type. 
The method to analyze the effect of these variables is as follows. First, the 
relationship between each variable will be defined. Then, all the variables that do not 
have any interaction or relationship with the variable under examination will be set to 
their mean values. Finally, for each level of categorical variables, the expected daily 
casualty rate, DCR, will be calculated. Graphs using these values will help in making 
conclusions and comparisons. 
In order to analyze the effect of the attacker’s strength to the DCR, the defender’s 
strength and attacker’s front width are held constant at their mean values of 12755 and 
15.35 Km.. The DCR is calculated by changing the attacker’s strength within its range in 
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the data set. Since there is only one data point under 10000, the value of the attacker’s 
strength varied between 10000 and 60000. Figure 20 shows the results of these 
calculations. Vertical lines show the first and third quantiles of the attacker’s strength to 
explain this idea better. 
The effect of the attacker’s strength is almost the same for each country in urban 
areas. An increase in the attacker’s strength up to 35000 for Allied and German forces 
and up to 50000 for Soviet forces increases the DCR. As the size of attacker’s strength 
becomes greater than these numbers, their DCR start decreasing. In order to achieve the 
lowest casualty rates, attackers should use either a higher or lower number of soldiers in 
urban operations. Although using fewer soldiers might result in lower casualty rates, it 
does not necessarily result in a victory.  
The decrease in the DCR for the lower values of the attacker’s strength is 
counterintuitive. The expectation is to have more casualties as strength decreases while 
other variables remain constant. The lower number of troops means a lower force ratio 
and lower linear density. In the case of a lower force ratio, higher casualty rates are 
expected. On the other hand, lower casualty rates are expected with lower linear 
densities. Thus, the conclusion might be that in urban operations, the effect of linear 
density is more important than the effect of force ratio. 
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Figure 20.   The Effect of the Attacker’s Strength on the DCR in Urban Areas 
 
The effect of the attacker’s strength is different in non-urban areas than in urban 
areas (Figure 21). In this graph, the attacker’s strength is varied between 5000 and 60000 
because of the existence of more than one data point where the attacker’s strength is less 
than 10000. The effect of the attacker’s strength is almost the same for each country. An 
increase in the attacker’s strength up to its median value decreases the DCR. Any 
increase over the median no longer decreases the DCR. The DCR is starts decreasing 
where the attacker’s strength is more than the median value. An increase in the attacker’s 
strength means a both higher force ratio and a higher linear density.  These two variables 
are expected to have an opposite effect on the DCR. However, Figure 21 implies that 
their effects are somewhat balanced. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the effect of 
force ratio and linear density is almost the same in non-urban areas. 
In order to achieve a lower casualty rate, it would be more advantageous for an 
attacker to use a higher number of soldiers in urban operations. In non-urban areas, it 
would be more advantageous for attackers to use more than 15000 soldiers. Any attack 
on non-urban areas with a force size less than 15000 could be costly in casualty rate 
terms.  
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Both Figures 20 and 21 support the conclusion that under the same circumstances, 
Soviet forces had the highest DCR and German and Allied forces had almost the same 
DCR as one another in each terrain type.  
 


















Figure 21.   The Effect of Attacker’s Strength on DCR in Non-Urban Area 
 
In order to analyze the effect of the defender’s strength on the DCR, the attacker’s 
strength and front width are held constant at their mean values of 24257 and 15.35 Km. 
For values in the range of the defender’s strength, the DCR is calculated. Figure 22 is the 
result of these calculations. The first and third quartiles of defender’s strength are also 
shown to explain the idea better. 
It is likely to see a higher DCR while attacking a stronger defender in urban 
operations. However,the slope of the increase goes to zero, as the defender’s strength gets 
closer to its third quartile value, 15943. Thus, adding one more person to the defender 
where its strength is less than 15943 increase the attacker’s DCR. This increase is higher 
when the defender’s strength is relatively small. While defending against an attacker who  
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has 24257 men and using a 15.35 km. front width, the optimal number of soldiers for the 
defender is 15943. Adding additional personnel to that force does not increase the 
attacker’s DCR, but might change the outcome of the battle. 
The effect of the defender’s strength is the same for each country. It is more likely 
that the Germans caused higher daily casualty rates to the Soviet forces than to the Allied 
forces. For example, if German forces were defending with 15000 soldiers in an urban 
area, the DCR for the Allied would be expected to be 0.97% while it would be expected 
to be 2.21% for Soviet forces. 
The effect of the defender’s strength in non-urban areas is the same as in urban 
areas. This agrees with the results of the regression model. In the model, there is no 
interaction term between the defender’s strength and terrain. It is possible to say that, in 
general, when the defender’s strength is between its first and third quartile, increasing the 
defender’s strength increases the attacker’s casualty rate. Finding this conclusion would 
be impossible if the effects of force ratio were not considered. The regression model 
suggests that the effect of force ratio where the front width is 15.35 km., is almost zero. 
Those effects are the same in urban areas as well. 
 
















Figure 22.   The Effect of the Defender’s Strength on the DCR in Non-Urban Areas 
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Since both the attacker and defender’s strength affect the value of the force ratio, it is 
very difficult to find the effects of force ratio on the DCR. An increase in the force ratio 
comes out as a result of an increase in the attacker’s strength or a decrease in the 
defender’s strength or both. To overcome this problem, first, the force ratio will be 
changed by holding the defender’s strength constant and changing the attacker’s strength 
and second vice versa. The values of the first and third quartile of the force ratio will be 
added to see the general picture. 
Figure 23 shows that changing the force ratio by means of changing the 
defender’s strength does not at all affect the DCRT. On the other hand, changing it by 
varying the attacker’s strength does affect the DCRT. As the force ratio increases, the 
daily casualty rate decreases. Although the effect is different for each type of terrain for 
values of force ratio outside the first and third quartile, it is possible to state that terrain 
does not change the effect of the force ratio except for an attack in an urban area by 
changing the attacker’s strength. These conclusions agree with the findings for the 
attacker’s strength and the defender’s strength.  
 
















Figure 23.   The Effect of the Force Ratio on the DCR (Terrain/Varying Force) 
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6. The Effect of the Attacker’s Front Width on the DCR 
The effect of the attacker’s front width to its casualty rate can be analyzed by 
fixing the variables with which the attacker’s front width does not interact. Fixing these 
variables results in the following equation: 
3 10.3621 8.727 3.8701 10.9237
0.0005 0.4902 0.0974 2
1.2336 2 3.0993 2
1.135 2 3.5611




= − + −
+ − −
− +
− + : 2
0.0001 : 2 0.1592 : 2
1.309 2 : 2
Urban XFrontWidth





The coefficient of front width and its interactions cause complexity in the 
analysis. A figure in which all the above variables are set to their mean makes the 
comparison easy. The attacker’s strength is set to 24257 and the defender’s strength to 
12755. The force ratio is not set to its mean; rather, it is set to the ratio of the mean 
attacker’s strength over the mean defender’s strength. Although the maximum front width 
is 73, there is only one point larger than 45. The attacker’s front width is therefore varied 
between 5 and 45 Km.. The author assumes that even at the maximum value, the trend 
does not change.  
Figure 24 shows the effect of front width on the DCR in urban operations. The 
effect is different for Allied forces than the other two forces. Front width and DCR are 
inversely related for Soviet and Germans forces. Increasing the front width results in 
lower casualty rates for Soviet and German forces. On the other hand, the effect of front 
width on Allied forces is different. Although its effect is the same in the first quantile, its 
effect is the opposite for the rest. For values of front width greater than 10 Km., the effect 
is proportional. As the front width increases, the casualty rate increases.  
The front width is extremely important for the Allies in urban areas. Under the 
same conditions, the higher the front width, the higher the daily casualty rate for the 
Allies. This is not true for the Germans and Soviets.  
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Figure 24.   The Effect of the Front Width in Urban Areas 
 
To analyze the effect of front width on the attacker’s DCR in non-urban 
operations, the coefficients related to Urban are set to zero. The attacker and defender’s 
strength is set to their mean. Linear density is calculated accordingly. 
A graph where every variable but the front width changes exhibits the trends 
clearly. Figure 25 explains the effect of front width on the attacker’s DCR. The effect of 
front width can be looked at in two parts, the effects where the front width is less than 8.5 
Km. and where it is higher. In the first part, the effect of increasing the front width 
increases the DCR of each country. The increase for Soviet forces is the highest. The 
effect for the Allied and Germans forces is almost the same.  
In the second part, it is apparent that the effect of front width on the Allies is 
different than the others. While a one-unit increase in front width decreases the DCR of 
the Germans and Soviets, it is constant for the Allies.  In order to achieve low casualty 
rates, German and Soviet forces should use either a front width higher than the third 
quantile or lower than the first quantile. Allied forces should use the mean front width, 9 
Km.. 
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Figure 25.   The Effect of the Front Width in Non-Urban Areas 
 
Comparing Figures 24 and 25 reveal the following conclusions. For values of 
front width higher than its first quantile, the effect of front width is different for Allied 
forces. For the values of front width greater than the first quantile, 78% of the 
occurrences, increasing the front width decreases the DCR. It is possible to state that 
front width has a significant effect on the DCR. The effect of front width is different for 
Allied forces than for the others. 
7. The Effect of the Linear Density on the DCR 
The effect of the number of men in front per km (linear density) depends on the 
terrain, the attacking country, the force ratio, the front width and the attacker’s strength. 
Although there is no direct relation to the defender’s strength, because of its interactions 
with the force ratio, it is imperative to add the defender’s strength as well. The following 
equation shows the relationship: 
3 8.727 3.8701 10.9237 0.0005
0.4902 1.2336 2 0.0974 2
0.9507 2 0.453 2
1.2877 :




= − + − +
− − −
+ −
+ 2 0.0444 : 2







Due to the way the variables derived, it is impossible to fix the attacker’s strength 
and front width to their mean values. An increase in linear density either results from a 
change in the attacker’s strength or a change in the attacker’s front width or both. 
Evaluating the third option is extremely difficult. Thus, there are two ways to see the 
effect of linear density on the attacker’s DCR. One is to change the linear density by 
changing the attacker’s strength, and the second is to change it by changing the attacker’s 
front width.  
However, changing the attacker’s front width does not produce the range of linear 
density that the data set possesses. Thus, the linear density’s effect will be analyzed by 
changing the attacker’s strength. The defender’s strength and the attacker’s width are set 
to their mean values. The other variables are calculated according to these values. The 
attacker’s strength is changed within its range. Figure 26 shows the relationship between 
the linear density and the attacker’s daily casualty rate. 
It is obvious that the DCR is a monotonic increasing function of the linear density 
up to the values of 3000. The attacker’s DCR increases as the linear density increases up 
to 3000 men per km. for German and Allied forces and up to 4000 per km. for Soviet 
forces. Values higher than these numbers decrease the DCR. The higher rates of the 
Soviet DCR at lower linear densities can be ignored because there are no data points for 
these values in the data set for the Soviets.  In other words, trying to estimate the DCR for 
the Soviet forces at densities lower than 1000 per Km is beyond the scope of this model.  
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Figure 26.   The Effect of the Linear Density in Urban Areas 
 
The effect of the linear density in non-urban areas is the same for each country. 
As the linear density increases in non-urban operations, the DCR decreases. This might 
be the effect of the “concentration of forces.” 
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Figure 27.   The Effect of the Linear Density in Non-Urban Areas 
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The effect of the linear density in each type of terrain is the same for each 
country. In general, while in urban areas, increasing linear density increases the DCR, it 
decreases the DCR in non-urban areas.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The best linear model contains all the available variables. Although some, such as 
the defender’s strength are not significant alone, their interaction with other variables 
forces these variables to stay in the model.  
An analysis of the plots showed that linear regression could be used to predict the 
attacker’s daily casualty rate. However, the derivation of variables, transformation and 
interactions make this model difficult to interpret. By using other tools, it is still possible 
to show the effects of each variable. The terrain, the attacker’s country and strength and 
the linear density affect the attacker’s daily casualty rate. On the other hand, the 
defender’s strength is not significant in most cases.  
The effect of terrain is statistically significant. The DCR is higher in non-urban 
operations. This is a counter-intuitive result. However, it is known that urban operations 
take more time than non-urban operations [Ref. 15]. Thus, it is possible to state that the 
number of casualties may be higher in urban operations even if the daily casualty rate is 
smaller.  
The attacker’s country is a significant factor. Its effect did change according to the 
terrain. The casualty rate of the Allies was almost the same as the Germans, but possibly 
slightly smaller. The Soviets suffered the highest casualty rates. 
The effect of the attacker’s strength significantly changes according to terrain. 
While an increase in the attacker’s strength increases the DCR in urban areas, it decreases 
the DCR in non-urban areas. However, with the same force size, it is more likely to have 
higher casualty rates in non-urban areas. 
The defender’s strength has the same effect in urban and non-urban areas. Thus, it 
does not change according to the terrain. This agrees with the absence of the term 
Urban:YStrength in the model. As the defender’s strength increases, the attacker’s 
casualty rate increases. Under the same circumstances, the Germans defense causes a 
higher casualty rate for the Soviets than the allies.   
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The effect of force ratio depends on the type of terrain. The force ratio has a 
significant effect on urban operations. However, its impact in non-urban operations is 
negligible. As expected, higher force ratios decrease the attacker’s daily casualty rate, 
more in urban operations. 
The relationship between the DCR and front width changes according to the 
terrain. Although the effect is similar for the Soviet and Germans in each type of terrain, 
the relationship is different for the Allies. In urban areas, the higher front width is better 
for the Soviet and German forces while it has the opposite impact on the Allies. In non-
urban areas, the effect is similar between the Germans and Soviets. Front width higher 
than 9 Km. decreases the DCR of the German and Soviet forces.  
The effect of linear density has a similar effect on the attacker’s strength. In urban 
operations, the higher linear density translates into higher casualty rates. In non-urban 




Chapter I demonstrated that urban operations have always been of great concern 
for war planners. It has been recommended that Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
(MOUT) be avoided because MOUT causes an excess use of resources. The number of 
casualties is one of them. Since urban structures provide advantages to the defender, even 
a highly inferior number of defenders cause a large number of casualties to the attacker. 
Despite the recommendation, it is no longer possible to avoid MOUT. As 
urbanization grows at a very high speed, it is impossible to imagine a campaign without 
MOUT. Especially if the attacker is overwhelmingly powerful, it is almost certain to 
conduct operations in urban areas.  
Until recently, the main concern in military research was to predict the outcome 
of the battle. As public opinion started giving more importance to the number of 
casualties, some studies conducted research on the number of casualties. This thesis 
analyses the effect of terrain on the daily casualty rates in MOUT. 
Descriptive statistics showed that, surprisingly, daily casualty rates tended to be 
higher in non-urban operations. However, this does not mean that MOUT produces more 
casualties. Remembering that MOUT takes more time, although the daily casualty rate is 
smaller in urban operations, the total number of casualties might still be higher.  
Among all the other factors, force ratio and terrain have the most effect on the 
DCR. Commanders of attacking forces should gather as much force as possible if the 
casualty rate is of great concern. Allied forces successfully used this tactic in WW II. The 
answers to the research questions are as follows. 
• In division-level engagements, the daily casualty rate is higher in non-
urban operations. However, this does not mean that the total number of 
casualties is also higher. 
• All the variables but the defender’s strength are important factors in 
estimating the daily casualty rate. However, given the relationship 
between variables, terrain and attacker’s strength are the most important 
factors. The low 2R  from the model implies that noise level is high and 
perhaps other variables should be included in the model. 
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• It is clear that the Soviets have the highest DCR. Allied forces have a 
lower daily casualty rate, which may be slightly lower than the Germans. 
• Since the data results from daily engagements, it was not possible to 
ascertain if the number of casualties is higher in urban operations. 
• Attackers have lower daily casualty rates than defenders. 
• The effects of each variable but defender’s strength change according to 
the terrain. 
During the analysis, two interesting points arose. The manner in which the allies 
understand urban warfare is different from the Soviets and Germans. They had a higher 
front width, as well as more linear density, force ratio and strength than the others. The 
allies gave more weight to MOUT. The other point is the Soviets’ understanding of war. 
They generally suffered high casualty rates. It may be that they employed a strategy of 
attrition: since they possessed a large number of human resources, they were perhaps less 
concerned with the casualty rate.  
Further research is possible on this subject. The defender’s daily casualty rate can 
be analyzed as well. One recommendation for further study is to use logarithm to 
transform the response variable, if necessary. Also, adding more variables such as the 
number of tanks, aircrafts, missiles and ships will very likely provide better results. If 
available, The Dupuy Institute’s DLEDB might help significantly.  
One other topic should be the analysis of different levels of engagements, at the 
battalion level, for example. It is expected that the daily casualty rates are higher at lower 




APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS 
DCR:  Attacker’s daily casualty rate 
DDCR:  Difference in attacker’s daily casualty rate 
DCRT:  Transformed form of attacker’s daily casualty rate 
DLEDB:  Division Level Engagement Database 
ETO:  European Theater of Operation 
ForceRatio:  Force Ratio 
TDI:  The Dupuy Institute 
MOUT:  Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
Urban:  Type of terrain “Urban” or “Non-Urban” 
XCasualty:  Attacker’s Daily Casualty Rate  
XC3:  0.3XCasualty  
XFrontWidth:  Attacker’s Front Width in kilometers 
XMenFront:  Attacker’s Number of Men in the Front Line, Linear Density 
XStrength:  Attacker’s Total Personnel Strength 
YCasualty:  Defender’s Daily Casualty Rate 
YC2:  0.2YCasualty  
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. Numeric Variables 
  XStrength YStrength ForceRatio XFrontWidth XMenFront 
Min: 5600 358 0.4 1 203.65 
1st Qu.: 14686 6960 1.32 8.575 1101.468 
Mean: 24257.3612755.01 2.88 15.35 2190.46 
Median: 19032 10300 1.87 12 1789 
3rd Qu.: 29895 15943 3.02 21.925 2497.74 
Max: 67829 57089 45.53 73 19322.08 
Total N: 253 253 253 253 253 
NA's : 0 0 0 9 9 
Std Dev.: 14348.55 8830.99 4.27 10.38 2141.08 
LCL Mean: 22480.7811661.59 2.35 14.04 1920.47 
UCL Mean: 26033.9513848.43 3.41 16.66 2460.46 
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Numeric Independent Variables 
 
2. Categorical Variables 
XCountry YCountry Urban 
Ger: 102 Allied: 27 Urban: 97 
Allied:110 Ger: 151 Non-Urban:156 
Sov: 41 Sov: 75   
Table 7. Summary Statistics for Categorical Independent Variables 
 
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
  XCasualty YCasualty 
Min: 0 0 
1st Qu.: 0.35 0.76 
Mean: 1.07 8.58 
Median: 0.65 2.4 
3rd Qu.: 1.29 6.3 
Max: 8.59 146.88 
Total N: 253 253 
NA's : 0 0 
Std Dev.: 1.29 20.24 
LCL Mean: 0.91 6.07 
UCL Mean: 1.23 11.09 
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APPENDIX C. TRANSFORMATION OF VARIABLES 
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Figure 28.   Transformed Attacker’s Daily Casualty Rate Plots 
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APPENDIX D. ATTACKER’S DAILY CASUALTY RATE 
MODELS  
A. MODEL WITHOUT INTERACTIONS 
  Value  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 1.4638 0.1492 9.8085 0.0000 
XCountryAllied 0.0095 0.0406 0.2343 0.8149 
XCountrySov 0.3884 0.0548 7.0858 0.0000 
Urban -0.0855 0.0389 -2.1970 0.0290 
XStrength 0.0000 0.0000 2.8183 0.0052 
ForceRatio -0.0189 0.0046 -4.0864 0.0001 
XFrontWidth2 -0.3795 0.0923 -4.1099 0.0001 
 
Table 9. Summary Statistics for the Model without Interactions 
 
Residual standard error: 0.2835 on 237 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.2625  
F-statistic: 14.06 on 6 and 237 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 1.109e-013  
9 observations deleted due to missing values  
 







(Intercept) 10.3621 1.7876 5.7967 0.0000 
XCountryAllied -8.7270 2.5764 -3.3872 0.0008 
XCountrySov 3.8701 3.3341 1.1608 0.2470 
Urban -10.9237 2.5378 -4.3044 0.0000 
XStrength 0.0005 0.0002 3.3077 0.0011 
YStrength 0.0000 0.0000 -1.6828 0.0938 
ForceRatio -0.4902 0.1531 -3.2018 0.0016 
XFrontWidth2 -1.2336 0.8208 -1.5028 0.1343 
XMenFront2 -0.0974 0.2930 -0.3324 0.7399 
XCountryAlliedXStrength 0.0000 0.0000 -2.6770 0.0080 
XCountrySovXStrength 0.0000 0.0000 1.1782 0.2400 
XCountryAlliedXFrontWidth2 3.0993 0.8966 3.4568 0.0007 
XCountrySovXFrontWidth2 -1.1350 1.0728 -1.0579 0.2913 
XCountryAlliedXMenFront2 0.9507 0.3035 3.1319 0.0020 
XCountrySovXMenFront2 -0.4530 0.4283 -1.0577 0.2914 







Urban:ForceRatio -0.0234 0.0167 -1.4049 0.1615 
Urban:XFrontWidth2 3.5611 0.8778 4.0571 0.0001 
Urban:XMenFront2 1.2877 0.3019 4.2648 0.0000 
XStrength:XFrontWidth2 -0.0001 0.0000 -2.9513 0.0035 
XStrength:XMenFront2 0.0000 0.0000 -3.3179 0.0011 
YStrength:XFrontWidth2 0.0000 0.0000 1.7358 0.0840 
ForceRatio:XFrontWidth2 0.1592 0.0506 3.1449 0.0019 
ForceRatio:XMenFront2 0.0444 0.0158 2.8017 0.0055 
XFrontWidth2:XMenFront2 -1.3090 0.4276 -3.0611 0.0025 
 
Table 10. Summary Statistics for the Model with Interactions 
 
Residual standard error: 0.2669 on 219 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.3962  
F-statistic: 5.988 on 24 and 219 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 5.496e-014  
9 observations deleted due to missing values 
 
Urban Non-Urban 
  Allied Germans Soviets Allied Germans Soviets 
(Intercept) -9.2886 -0.5616 3.3085 1.6351 10.3621 14.2322
XStrength 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
YStrength 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ForceRatio -0.5136 -0.5136 -0.5136 -0.4902 -0.4902 -0.4902
XFrontWidth2 5.4268 2.3275 1.1925 1.8657 -1.2336 -2.3686
XMenFront2 2.1410 1.1903 2.1410 0.8533 -0.0974 -0.5504
XStrength:XFrontWidth2 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
XStrength:XMenFront2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
YStrength:XFrontWidth2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ForceRatio:XFrontWidth2 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 
ForceRatio:XMenFront2 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 
XFrontWidth2:XMenFront2 -1.3090 -1.3090 -1.3090 -1.3090 -1.3090 -1.3090
 
Table 11. Coefficients Given the Attacker’s Country and Terrain 
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